CBP falls short in its efforts to start implementing the "100-percent screening" mandate issued by Congress. The issues involved are numerous, costly, and extremely complicated. Nonetheless, failure is not an option.
The could-have/should-have (but did not) scenarios of the past serve as abundant reminders that the cost of national preparedness is only a fraction of the much higher cost that must always be paid for not being prepared.
After the storm comes the rainbow. Supposedly. After a disaster comes the debris - and the problem of what to do with it. Surprisingly, perhaps, there are some profitable solutions that should be considered.
At a time when defense of the U.S. homeland is a major concern, the National Guard is playing a much-increased role in U.S. operations overseas. The best way to fill the capabilities gap is to establish a non-deployable Home Guard under the Department.
Thanks to mutual-aid compacts between neighboring political jurisdictions, first-responder cooperation at mass-casualty incidents is often a multi-agency effort. But before the agencies can work together they must first be able to speak the same language.
Is it something a first-responder wears for personal protection? Is it some special equipment he or she is using? A combination of both? Can it be used to save the lives of victims as well? Yes, sometimes, sometimes, and yes but not always.
How does the department manage, and reconcile, the complex and politically difficult task of identification security with privacy needs, site-access requirements, and the National Incident Management System process?
An ancient & honorable Renaissance word is put to good use at FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness, where moulage artists replicate broken arms, cuts, bruises, & other injuries to make first-responder training more realistic and more effective.
The 2008 presidential election year could be the most important in U.S. history. All of the major candidates are promising "change" - but are usually short on specifics. An important point to remember is that not all change is for the better.
The first anthrax terrorist attack on the United States was relatively minor. Now a second attack, exponentially more lethal, is almost certain. When, not if, it happens, the decision makers in Congress & the White House will have only themselves to blame