Hurricane Helene in September 2024 devastated western North Carolina with wind, water, and landslides. These natural phenomena brought with them infrastructure destruction, resulting in a frequently overlooked public safety planning factor: isolation. Public safety, government officials, and elected officials became isolated physically and technologically, unable to perform basic daily tasks. Destruction of roads, buildings, and energy and telecommunications infrastructure was a visible aspect of the storm.
However, the technological damage was invisible, leading to fear and a sense of physical isolation that public safety officials and those in the area had not experienced. Helene destroyed over 1,700 miles of fiber-optic cable, which brought technological isolation to 19 of North Carolina’s 100 counties—unimaginable to Emergency Support Function (ESF) 2 planners. By understanding the emergency communications ecosystem, communities can mitigate communication gaps when faced with a technological isolation event.
An Interoperable Ecosystem
At the forefront of emergency communications in each U.S. state or territory is a statewide interoperability coordinator (SWIC). The SWIC’s responsibility is to broker relationships in order to establish and maintain pathways for each emergency communications ecosystem component outlined in the National Emergency Communication Plan. This ecosystem, as explained in the article “PACEing a Communications Resilience Plan” by Washington, D.C., SWIC Charlie Guddemi, includes four pathways:
- Government to Government – The ability of government entities, public service, and public safety to effectively share information that facilitates government processes and services.
- Government to Public – The ability for government entities to share information with residents and visitors of their jurisdiction regarding emergent or non-emergent issues.
- Public to Government – The ability for residents and visitors to share information with government entities regarding emergent and non-emergent issues.
- Public to Public – The ability for humans to interact with one another.
Initial Impacts: Helene
Hurricane Helene destroyed public safety communications networks on September 27, 2024, resulting in a communications ecosystem failure. Command and control centers received requests for assistance via public safety land mobile radio (LMR), amateur radio, satellite phones, and any other method still available at the local level. Additionally, the destruction of critical infrastructure resulted in some counties’ inability to communicate with local emergency operations centers. ESF-2 mobilized communications strike teams to make contact and restore continuity of government processes. These teams carried public safety radios, low earth orbit satellite systems, temporary networking equipment, fuel, and small amounts of food and water. The teams then used these resources to reestablish temporary communications methods, allowing information to flow into state coordination centers, restoring the government-to-government pathway within the communications ecosystem.
North Carolina’s robust and versatile public safety 911 network routed 911 calls to areas not impacted by storm damage. This technology is called an Emergency Services IP Network (ESINet) and is often synonymous with Next Generation 911.
On September 28, 17 public safety answering points (PSAPs) lost the ability to receive 911 calls due to either structural or network damage, resulting in residents being unable to use smart devices to make phone calls. The ESINet worked as designed, sending calls from those residents with cell service to PSAPs hundreds of miles away.
However, during Helene, remote PSAPs faced the challenge of transmitting information from the caller back to the area experiencing the emergency. In response, North Carolina ESF-2 coordinators created rudimentary, ad-hoc solutions to gather, triage, and prioritize information and then send it back to PSAPs via public safety radio or temporary networks created using satellite internet equipment.
When a catastrophe destroys the emergency communications ecosystem, it is unrealistic to assume that 20 satellite phones or 100 low earth orbit satellite terminals are obtainable. Further, technological solutions may not solve every issue. Therefore, emergency management leaders should report a technology issue but ask themselves, “What specific problem are we trying to solve?” Relevant decision-makers should then work collaboratively to identify the most appropriate solution.
Planning for Communications Isolation
Government entities, whether local, state, tribal, or federal, require information to help inform decision-making processes. Disasters add stress, confusion, and the feeling of being out of control, which leads to strained working relationships. Disasters exponentially increase the need for information, putting pressure on technology networks and platforms. Catastrophic disasters remove the government’s ability to get and share information, which leads to feelings in the public of isolation, anger, and an overwhelming urge to take action.
While emergency management and public safety professionals plan for these scenarios, executive-level leaders and elected officials often do not, leading to relationship challenges and unrealistic expectations that things will return to normal within a few hours when, in reality, it could be days or weeks. Leveraging the SWIC in planning conversations will increase productivity and strengthen policy.
Emergency management professionals are often surprised when they cannot communicate with the public via their standard alert and warning methods. However, there must be connectivity to commercially available networks to receive a wireless emergency alert. Residents with no connectivity to information become technologically isolated and detached from what has happened and what may be happening. For these reasons, emergency plans should include technological isolation scenarios in accepted public preparation guidelines, such as the book by Margaret O’Leary The First 72 Hours: A Community Approach to Disaster Preparedness (iUniverse, 2004), or should expand on the “Get Tech Ready” concept to include AM/FM radio and other non-technical communication types, such as aircraft signaling. Active public engagement with communities to discuss this scary situation will lead to more informed residents.
AM/FM radio became an excellent resource for all communications ecosystem pathways during Helene. Emergency managers in the affected areas went live on air to broadcast information and instructions. Residents called in to make reports of people stranded with no food. They also called in to establish proof of life to loved ones. For this reason, emergency managers who establish a relationship with local broadcast professionals will make engaging the government-to-public pathway of the communications ecosystem more efficient and valuable.
Setting Strategic Goals That Lead to Tactical Objectives
On September 29, commercial wireless providers reported a complete loss of cellular voice and data in 11 counties in western North Carolina. Although specific numbers are unknown, estimates show that this destruction led to the technological isolation of more than 150,000 people, including all four pathways of the emergency communications ecosystem. As communications strike teams aggressively sought to restore continuity of government processes, prioritizing strategic goals became necessary to guide tactical communications-based responses. North Carolina ESF-2 leadership identified these goals:
- Gain access to all critical wireless and wireline infrastructure.
The destruction of roads and streets made access to tower sites on mountaintops extremely difficult. Debris flow was also challenging due to the rapid rise of water, making bridges impassable if not destroyed. Without access, key infrastructure could not be refueled or repaired.
- Support efforts to provide fuel to critical communications
Helene significantly impacted energy infrastructure, resulting in the loss of power to many critical communications locations, including public safety LMR and broadcast infrastructure (Public Broadcasting Service, AM/FM radio, and over-the-air television). Prioritizing power restoration and the parallel tactical objective to fuel generators kept many of these sites on the air.
- Support restoration of commercial wireline infrastructure.
Restoring commercial networks took days and sometimes weeks during Helene. Emergency managers should prepare themselves for a similar situation. At all levels, government officials often do not understand how wireline and wireless infrastructure works. This lack of understanding is demonstrated by questions such as, “How many cell sites are down?” or “When is cell service going to be fixed?”, which are usually unfair to those trying to restore service. A more targeted question would be “How many central offices are damaged or non-functioning?”
- Think of a commercial network central office as the brain, or head, of a stick figure.
During several executive-level briefings, North Carolina ESF-2 leadership used the stick figure analogy to help decision-makers understand how commercial wireline and wireless networks function. Focus on restoring commercial network central offices and then work on connecting the spine, arms, and legs, which would be fiber-optic cables in this case. Fiber-optic cables connect wireless cellular sites (hands and feet) to the “brain,” thus restoring commercial networks.
- Establish a future operations strategy.
The first week of the communications-based response to Helene overwhelmed the first wave of personnel and resources, due to the high operations tempo. Forecasting personnel, equipment, and restoration needs to support tactical objectives is vital.
Hurricane Helene presented unimaginable challenges to emergency management professionals as a result of widespread technological failure. As such, technological isolation should be on everyone’s minds. To better prepare the public, openly discussing technical isolation risks should be common practice along the government-to-public pathway, similar to the fire safety initiative that led to the “Stop, Drop, and Roll” campaign. The more open discussion on the scary topic of silence in all pathways of the emergency communications ecosystem, the more prepared communities will be for the unimaginable. SWICs and emergency managers must immediately create and implement plans to address these unique challenges to prepare for the next natural, human-caused, or technological disaster.
Greg Hauser
Greg Hauser joined the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (NCEM) in 2018 as the statewide interoperability coordinator (SWIC) and leader of Emergency Support Function 2 activities. Before joining NCEM, Greg spent 17 years as a telecommunicator and search and rescue communications specialist for the Charlotte Fire Department. He serves as the vice chair of the National Council of SWICs. Throughout his career, he has led first responder communications efforts for numerous large-scale incidents and events, including the 2012 Democratic National Convention, Hurricane Irene, and Hurricane Matthew. Most recently, he led North Carolina’s first responder communications response and recovery efforts for hurricanes Helene, Florence, and Dorian and served as an advisor to the coordination efforts for the 2016 and 2020 Republican National Conventions. Greg is originally from Becket, Massachusetts, and attended the University of New Haven (Connecticut), where he earned a bachelor’s degree in Fire Investigation and Fire Administration. He also completed UNC-Chapel Hill’s Community Preparedness and Disaster Management master’s program.
