The Irish Potato Famine demonstrated the tragic effects an agriculturally based disease can have on an entire society. In 1845, the P. infestans pathogen swept across Ireland, and famine ravaged the population, killing two to three million people. Because potatoes were a staple of the Irish diet, the widespread loss of potato crops to the disease showed the fragility of the food chain, even before the modern era of terrorism. The effects from this period of history echo in Irish society today, as well as in the family histories of Americans of Irish descent.
In the modern age, the concern among policymakers and security experts regarding crops and livestock is their vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although Irelandās potato blight was destructive to the Irish population, modern agroterror attacks could be designed to hurt a nationās economy rather than killing its people. Accordingly, groups like al-Qaida or other domestic groups that exist are likely to focus their strategy on highly disruptive attacks such as agroterrorism, which would have detrimental effects on the U.S. economy as well as overall domestic morale. It will be the responsibility of law enforcement agencies with requisite knowledge and resources to investigate any possible acts of agroterror and attribute them to the responsible groups. The fact remains, however, that positively identifying the group who committed the act of agroterror and the modus operandi could take investigators a considerable amount of time.
Food Production Resilience
Risks of agroterror have increased tremendously since 2023. Government officials must still plan for the potentiality of agroterror attacks to āincrease as ā¦ 4th industrial revolution technologies are implemented in agriculture.ā A major attack against one of the U.S.ās largest production crops such as the wheat supply could have severe economic impacts during an extended period of time, especially given that the current war in Ukraine could affect import yields from that country. In a 2002 address to Congress, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee Jim Saxton stated that an agroterror incident could immediately cost in the ārange of $25 billion to $60 billion.ā Given the inflation rate, this could cost as much as $106 billion today. Puccinia graminis, also known as black stem rust, could pose a threat to the U.S. wheat supply as an example. The U.S. is currently a major exporter to the global market and produces approximately 6ā7 percent of the total supply. Although the total export value of wheat to the global food market is not large, the deleterious effects of such a disease on this fourth highest producing crop in Americaās ābread basketā would result in an immediate economic fallout. A 2007 study regarding a simulated agroterror attack in St. Lawrence County, New York, published by Cornell University showed that economic recovery following an attack could take as long as nine quarters to regain equilibrium.
According to 2022 research published in Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, food production resilience is state-dependent and is further dependent upon the crop itself. There are also variations in what exactly constitutes resilience. As an example, Figure 2 of the report demonstrates a baseline cow meatātrade graph based on overall state production. Texas has a strong baseline, while states in the Northeast have far less meat production. Ultimately, the dissemination of products such as meat across the U.S. would depend heavily on the supply chain, transportation, and distribution network. If a major outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or āmad cow disease,ā were to take place in Texas, given that there would be attempts to stop any further dissemination, other states with heavy meat production (such as Nebraska or Kansas) would most likely fill any product shortfall. Since there are multiple companies regionally aligned throughout the U.S. for meat production, the probable second- or third-order effects would be felt at the consumer level, as a meat shortage would most likely affect overall product prices.
Consumers would also feel the effects of shortages and empty shelves of any particular targeted product. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, āsupermarkets in major American cities stock only a 7-day supply of food; therefore, any significant and continuing disruption in supply quickly will lead to severe shortages.ā While this is a concern, it would take a major, concerted effort to target multiple products sold at market. Anything from wheat in bread to livestock products could be affected. This does not take into account grain products that feed livestock. The only viable way to attack all products sold at market would be through an attack at the nutrient base of the food chain: on crops for livestock feed or human consumption prior to harvest.
Consequences Beyond Crops
Economic disruption would be the major consequence of any agroterror attack. Agriculture accounts for nearly 17 percent of U.S. employment, and sudden crop losses would most likely result in high unemployment. There is also the possibility that, through various trade agreements, shortages of products (like wheat) caused by an agroterror attack could be offset by increased imports from countries like Ukraine or Kazakhstan. In 2024, wheat imports were down 5 percent, which shows there is no major emergency in wheat demand. If a major wheat shortage were to hit the U.S. domestic yield, the demand would be filled by imports from central Asia and eastern Europe, like the countries of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. As an example of how Ukraine is a powerhouse in grain exports, it āshipped a wartime record of 5.2 million metric tons of grainsā in February 2024. However, with the war in Ukraine, it is difficult to ascertain if any supply from that country could fulfill any need the U.S. would have regardless of the supply it could produce during war. Ultimately, it would depend on U.S. foreign policy strategy to adjust any need for a product that could be affected by a domestic agroterror attack.
Unlike the Irish Potato Famine, the biggest threat to agriculture is not necessarily starvation from a crop shortage, as there are alternative sources of caloric intake that could replace a targeted product. Caloric and associated deficiencies from necessary nutrients related to a food shortage, however, is a concern for national security strategists. The primary impact of an agroterror attack would most likely be social panic, as consumers may lose confidence in the food supply network. Additionally, consumer confidence in the U.S. food supply safety is staggeringly low: nearly 32% of Americans have concern over food safety. Understanding how to prevent an attack against agricultural products is key to having a resilient system. One recommendation by a Rand Corporation paper to prevent the possibility of an agroterror attack is to decrease the concentration and intensity of contemporary farming practices (such as industrial cattle farms). Since the Industrial Revolution, industrial farming practices have become the norm, and one possible deterrent to an agroterror attack would be a greater reliance on locally produced consumer products.
Although agroterrorism poses a threat to the world and specifically the U.S., it would still take considerable determination by threat actors to affect a large geographic area covered in expansive crops. Typically, agricultural products are distributed by regions, except for specialty and niche crops such as citrus fruits. Furthermore, the U.S. agricultural industry contributes 5.6 percent of gross domestic product, and an attack against the U.S. farm industry would have far-reaching impacts. In 2021, the Department of Commerce showed that U.S. farm products contributed to $177 billion in exports. With this knowledge in mind, it is important to remember that terrorist groups like al-Qaida continue to be committed to damaging the U.S. economy. Protection against such an attack will require coordinated, sustained efforts by intelligence agencies seeking out any signs of this strategy. Additionally, domestic law enforcement agencies tasked with the investigation of such attacks must be given proper funding and resources to respond. The funding of agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which may be tasked with the investigation of an attack, is crucial to understanding how the attack occurred and by whom.

Michael (Mike) Nicholls
Michael (Mike) Nicholls is a retired Army explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer. He has a B.S. in sociology and is currently completing his M.A. in emergency and disaster management with a graduate certificate in emergency management executive leadership from American Military University. He is also completing a graduate certificate in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear defense from Wright State University. He was previously assigned to multiple EOD positions throughout the U.S. Army. His email address is mikenichollsaaa@hotmail.com.
- Michael (Mike) Nicholls#molongui-disabled-link