Security in and Around D.C. – Following the Informational Dots

In 2021, several people died, approximately 140 police officers were assaulted, and countless other physical and psychological injuries went unreported during a single-day catastrophe in Washington, D.C., which was far from a single-day event. Instead, the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol was a culmination of malicious activity “dots” that spanned months before the incident. Outside of public view, agencies in and around Washington, D.C., were planning behind the scenes, attempting to connect those dots, and putting plans in place to mitigate the consequences of the escalating violence that was all but inevitable. However, the key players preparing for the First Amendment rally on the Ellipse and the certification of the presidential vote count soon found themselves in the middle of an emergency response. 

Amid political controversy, those same agencies have been preparing since 2020 for other election events by using lessons learned and after-action reports to identify and close security gaps. These lessons were shared on September 4-5, 2024, at the D.C. Interoperability Summit, which drew 824 registered attendees from 33 states and two territories to address “Preparing for the 60th Presidential Inauguration.” This article provides a glimpse of the discussions at that summit and key action items that agencies should consider in any jurisdiction to prepare for future threats. 

Attack on the U.S. Capitol 

So much public attention has focused on January 6, 2021, and the events that followed. However, it is just as important for emergency preparedness and public safety professionals to consider the actions prior to those events. Although agencies typically rely on permit applicants to provide expected crowd sizes and locations, they understand that they are not always accurate. Intelligence revealed an escalation of violence leading up to the certification of 2020 election ballots. So, security planning occurred, but the timeframe was compressed as rally plans changed and threats rapidly evolved. As participants gathered for the Women for America First rally (known as “Stop the Steal”), the discovery of two pipe bombs (placed on January 5 and discovered the next day) near the Republican and Democratic National Committee headquarters changed the dynamics of the day as law enforcement responses shifted and resources depleted. Back at the Capitol, the words “shots fired” soon rippled across agencies, and the violence escalated. 

As part of their daily roles, police officers balance law enforcement, public safety, and First Amendment rights. For the first time in their careers, though, officers at the Capitol building faced threats from all sides as a large protest turned into a riot. Some rioters approached from the left, right, and front. Some maneuvered behind the officers while others climbed up the walls and scaffolding from below or jumped down from above. There were not enough resources to arrest all the rioters on the scene, so law enforcement focused on crowd control, the defense of the Capitol and the legislators inside, and the safety of law enforcement officers. Additional investigators and officers managed potential threats at other locations around the city, including the bomb investigation, crowd control at the Ellipse, and transportation egress. 

Some factors that law enforcement did not anticipate that day were the crowd density, cell phone disruptions, familiarity with the Capitol building’s layout to outside law enforcement, and the level of involvement in the crowd by active military, police, fire, emergency medical services, pilots, and other professionals sworn to protect communities. Following the event, political rhetoric and social media mis- and disinformation distracted from the facts of that day, and memories have faded with time. However, much still needs to be learned about how the events transpired and what agencies can do to prevent history from repeating in 2024 and beyond.  

Reflect on the Past, Plan for the Future 

As the 2024 presidential election, certification of votes, and inauguration approach, the 2020 election provides valuable security lessons to learn. Those lessons, coupled with updated intelligence and new factors, provide a roadmap to secure the upcoming election and subsequent special events. Some nefarious tactics will be implemented again, while others will be new. Federal and state agencies continually examine the threat environment and develop plans to thwart foreign and domestic attacks. Foreign actors still try to interfere in the cyber domain, which could lead to physical interference. Domestic political violence groups continue to pose physical, cyber, and operational risks within the election infrastructure, such as threats against election workers. 

January 6, 2021, was a violent day with severe criminal charges, including assault on federal officers, vandalism and destruction of property, assault on the media, larceny (theft of government property), trespassing, and seditious conspiracy. Some Capitol breach case investigations are ongoing, with over 1,000 charged to date. The D.C. Interoperability Summit convened a multidisciplinary multijurisdictional group of agency representatives to find actionable solutions to current and future threats. Recommendations those representatives shared included: 

• Develop a PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) communications plan; 

• When sending a liaison officer to another agency’s command post, make sure that individual has operational experience, is well-versed in the incident action plan, and is authorized to make decisions; 

• Diffuse and correct misinformation; 

• Be transparent in sharing information with the public; 

• Attend planning meetings; 

• Include all key stakeholders in training exercises; 

• Make exercises realistic; 

• Brief executives on resource needs and processes during the planning; 

• Consider how to screen for extremism within agencies and organizations; 

• Reevaluate personal protective equipment needs; 

• Think strategically; 

• Cultivate interagency collaboration and partnerships; 

• Address the health of responders by developing wellness plans that include mental and physical well-being; 

• Understand how the actions of one agency affect other agencies; and 

• Take politics out of public safety. 

The 2024 presidential election, vote certification, and inauguration are quickly approaching. Agencies across the United States are gathering intelligence, sharing information, and implementing plans to protect communities from domestic and foreign threats related to the U.S. elections. As preparedness professionals already know, the more planning and preparation that occur before an incident, the better the outcome when disaster strikes. One presenter shared the following words of wisdom on September 4, 2024, at the D.C. Interoperability Summit. As agencies prepare for whatever threats the nation may face, remember that “elections are political, but election security is not.” 

Stay tuned for the full after-action report from the 2024 D.C. Interoperability Summit in Fall 2024.

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Correction: The date of the January 6 attack has been corrected from 2020 to 2021. The presidential election was in 2020 and the vote certification at the Capitol was in 2021.