The COVID-19 pandemic takes its toll in terms of human lives and global economic consequences.
Social distancing has proven to be the most promising strategy against emerging viruses without borders,
but the heavy economic damage that follows puts in question the possibility of its continuation. In
fact, weighing the two elements raises an important debate: What is the acceptable loss in order to win
this battle?
Emergency management is everything to everybody, but it often lacks the glue that is so desperately
needed to manage catastrophic events. This is likely the result of two common pitfalls that the
profession has long suffered from, pitfalls that can begin as soon as one walks out of the meeting or
training room door: apathy and atrophy. Apathy can be defined as a lack of interest, passion,
excitement, or concern. When not effectively addressed, apathy can then lead to atrophy, a long gradual
decline in effectiveness. Such weakening is caused by underuse of key knowledge, skills, and abilities.
At about 6:15 a.m. on 8 November 2018, an iron hook holding up a 115,000-volt line broke, dropping the live wire and sparking a blaze. Thirty minutes later, what would come to be known as the Camp Fire was out of control. Officials ordered the evacuation of the nearby town of Paradise, home to 26,000 people. The town was soon burned to the ground. Within hours, the fire destroyed 13,893 homes and killed more people (85), than any other California wildfire.
News agencies often use the term âunprecedentedâ when referring to COVID-19 and other recent
disasters and events. Unprecedented refers to something that was not known or experienced before.
However, it is often used synonymously with the word âunexpected.â Of course, COVID-19 did not exist
before 2019, Hurricane Sandy did not exist before 2012, the U.S. was not attacked by terrorists on the
scale of 9/11 before 2001, and so on.
Similar to pandemic preparedness, the U.S. government is not doing enough to prepare for failure of
municipal water systems when the electric grid goes down. Government programs do not address loss of law
and order or cessation of food production and delivery services. Elected and appointed officials often
downplay the number of deaths to be expected and the lack of preventative measures. They also do not
acknowledge people taking advantage of stresses on law enforcement to loot and maraud in the event of a
collapse. Swift action is needed now to mitigate potential consequences of a future triggered collapse.
If necessity is the mother of invention, the new coronavirus is quickly birthing a lot of innovations. Parts of U.S. society may be forever changed by this pandemic. As of 13 April 2020, the United States had over 550,000 confirmed cases and nearly 22,000 deaths, with emergency preparedness and response agencies preparing for much more to come. Combinations of social distancing, home quarantine, closure of schools and universities, and case isolation are now being extensively practiced. Creativity is being implemented each day to overcome response barriers to those at work and meet the needs of those asked to stay at home.
Lately, there have been a number of discussions about protecting healthcare workers, bolstering the ranks with volunteerism, and utilizing alternative care sites and providers. There have been call-ups of retired clinicians of all stripes, field promotions of health sciences students, and alternative venues for care like telemedicine. However, one group that does not seem to be as considered or fully addressed is that of home health workers. Although they are often tangentially referenced in healthcare environment conversations, this unique, variable, and incompletely accounted landscape is potentially an area of increased risk for providers, patients, public spread, and mortality.
In contrast to expertsâ estimates of millions of deaths, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) pandemic influenza planning scenario refers to just 87,000 casualties â not much more than a bad
seasonal flu. This version of the scenario seen in public forums has planning assumptions on virus
lethality, worker absenteeism, and maintenance of law and order that are irresponsibly optimistic. When
planning for security, it is better to err on the side of worst-case scenarios. The DHS uses 15 National
Planning Scenarios. Scenario 3 is âBiological Disease Outbreak â Pandemic Influenza,â and Scenario 4 is
âBiological Attack â Pneumonic Plague.â
As the United States continues to respond to the coronavirus pandemic, police departments across the country are beginning to feel the impact of the virus on their day-to-day staffing. In New York, three officers have died, more than 900 members of the NYPD have tested positive for the coronavirus and 5,200 have called out sick. In Detroit, Michigan, two officers have died due to the coronavirus, including a 38-year old dispatcher and nearly one-fourth of the force is quarantined. In Puerto Rico, the entire police department of RincĂłn is quarantined. In California, law enforcement officials are exploring the option of assigning detectives, administrative personnel, and special operations personnel to street duty. However, the country has other reinforcements that should be deployed.
The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security is a credible source for dealing with pandemics and
disaster response. In 2018, the Center created a realistic simulation of a moderately contagious and
moderately lethal virus, similar to the lethality of the 2002 SARS outbreak, which killed about 10
percent of those infected. Designed by senior scholar Eric Toner, the âClade Xâ simulation was based on
a virus that was bioengineered and released by a group modelled after Aum Shinrikyo â the cult that
released sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995. According to Toner, researchers are convinced that this
scenario is plausible â a virus like this could be created and spread to ultimately kill up to 900
million people if no vaccine were successful. Health care systems would collapse, panic would spread,
and the U.S. stock market would crash. Toner warned that a pandemic could cause the collapse of hospital
systems, âMost people donât know how close we came to having that happen in the U.S. in 2009 … due to
a not particularly virulent flu strain.â